Torts and Workmen\u27s Compensation by Malone, Wex S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1955-1956 Term
February 1957
Torts and Workmen's Compensation
Wex S. Malone
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Wex S. Malone, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 17 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol17/iss2/14
Torts and Workmen's Compensation
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Proof of Negligence - Res Ipsa Loquitur
Although our courts in Louisiana still indulge elaborate dis-
cussions on the meaning of res ipsa loquitur, they have succeeded
in freeing themselves in many instances of the arbitrary limita-
tions on the use of the doctrine that give considerable trouble in
other jurisdictions. For instance, in Saunders v. Walker,' plain-
tiff hired defendant, who was a professional expert in the in-
stallation of cooling systems, to install such a machine in his
home. Defendant used rubber tubing instead of copper at some
places. One night the tubing came loose where it joined the
metal pipe, and shortly thereafter plaintiff's home was seriously
injured by an onrush of water under pressure. If plaintiff shows
these facts and nothing more, should he be denied recovery?
The inferences all point to negligence. Defendant was an expert,
while plaintiff was a layman who had entrusted the safety of
his dwelling to defendant's care. Defendant knew that if the
rubber hose slipped it would cause damage. It was up to him,
not plaintiff, to work out a safe connection. The connection he
made slipped within a few months thereafter. There would seem
to be a normal inference that a connection will not slip within
this short period if it has had the attention which the defendant
undertook to give it under the circumstances. Of course, de-
fendant could contradict this normal inference by showing that
someone tampered with the gadget after he had installed it, or
even by showing through experts that the most carefully in-
stalled connections frequently break, and that this risk is in-
digenous to the installation of coolers. But he succeeded in
making no such showing, and the natural inference prevails.
The court said the case was proper for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur despite the fact that plaintiff had
not attempted to show that all the circumstances were within
the physical control of defendant at the time of the accident.2
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 La. 426, 86 So.2d 89 (1956).
2. I have attempted to discuss the requirement of "exclusive control" in Malone,
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference--A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases,




The constant increase in negligence cases arising from the
operation of automobiles has induced courts in the past to reach
out for easy rules of thumb which they have hoped would make
it possible to dispose of these controversies with a minimum of
effort. Thus, there came into being arbitrary pronouncements
such as the Stop, Look and Listen Rule devised by Justice Holmes
in Baltimore and Ohio Railway v. Goodman,3 and the Assured
Clear Distance Rule4 which still probably prevails in a narrow
majority of states. The Stop, Look and Listen Rule never met
with a warm reception in the state courts5 and it was finally
overruled by the United States Supreme Court itself.6 But the
Assured Clear Distance Rule is still paid lip service, although
it is being rapidly eroded by the creation of numerous exceptions
which threaten eventually to reduce it to utter impotency.
The reasons for an aversion to these doctrines are not dif-
ficult to find. First, they are the pronouncements of proposi-
tions that are inconsistent with common observation and com-
mon sense. Motorists simply do not stop, look, and listen at
each and every crossing. And if their failures in this respect are
to deprive them arbitrarily of a right of recovery without refer-
ence to the circumstances otherwise, the result would be to grant
a wholesale immunity to railroads for the injuries and deaths
they cause at crossings through their neglect of duty. Similarly,
motorists do not drive at night with such meticulous care that
they can bring their vehicles to a complete stop within the range
of vision afforded by their headlights. The elimination of ac-
cidents at night can be better accomplished by stepping with a
firm foot on those who obstruct the public highways either by
casting objects upon the roads or by allowing their vehicles to
remain stationary without affording adequate warning of the
3. 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
4. This rule is usually attributed to Lauson v. Town of Fond du Lac, 141
Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909).
5. See the excellent discussion in PROSSER, TE LAW OF TORTS, § 40 (2d ed.
1955). Of course, the failure to look or listen before crossing a railway track
where the driver's vision is in no way obscured and he is familiar with the cross-
ing would usually amount to failure to use ordinary care and will preclude re-
covery. A recent illustration is Delta Fire & Casualty Co. v. Texas & Pacific
Ry., 229 La. 710, 86 So.2d 681 (1956). In such cases Last Clear Chance Rules
are seldom applicable, since the railroad is entitled to assume that a vehicle will
not attempt to cross the tracks in the face of the approaching train. When it
has become obvious to the train operators that such a crossing will be attempted
it is usually too late to bring the train to a halt.
6. Pokora v. Wabash R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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danger. The second reason for the decline of arbitrary rules of
this kind is that they usually have the effect of giving increased
life to the unpopular doctrine of contributory negligence. They
do not create liability. They serve more often to extinguish it,
and usually the worst offender becomes the beneficiary.
Although our courts in Louisiana have not yet seen fit to
measure the obligation of the night driver by the standard of
ordinary care under the circumstances and they still adhere in
form at least to the Assured Clear Distance Rule, yet they have
riddled the rule with so many exceptions that it serves little more
purpose in the law than the appendix does in the human body.
The courts discuss it solemnly in their opinions while they ignore
it in practice. Hasn't the time come to throw the rule out of
our jurisprudence and to judge each case on its merits through
the reasonable care formula? Other courts have done So. Our
latest case recognizing an exception to the Assured Clear Dis-
tance Rule is Vowell v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co.8
Defendant's truck obstructed the highway by remaining sta-
tionary for about five minutes on the travelled portion without
rear lights. Plaintiff approached from the rear at what the
court regarded as a reasonable speed with his headlights dimmed
for the benefit of oncoming traffic, and he rammed the rear
of the obstructing truck. As usual, it was the plaintiff, not the
truck, that suffered the most severe injury. The court found
that the Assured Clear Distance Rule does not apply to "unex-
pected and unusual obstructions" that the plaintiff had no reason
to anticipate. If the obstruction had been "expected" or "usual,"
there would be no difficulty in finding that the plaintiff was
guilty of ordinary contributory negligence in failing to reduce
his speed and to bring his car under control accordingly. Hence
we find that the Assured Clear Distance Rule is not needed in
the cases where it would be applicable, and, conversely, it is not
applicable in the cases where it would differ from the ordinary
rules of negligence.
Another instance involving an obstruction of a highway and
in which the defense of contributory negligence was dismissed
7. In addition to the discussion by PROSsEu, THE LAW OF TORTS n. 5 (2d
ed. 1955), see the cases collected in 23 CALIm. L. REV. 498 (1935).
8. 229 La. 798, 86 So.2d 909 (1956). Followed in Dyck v. Manufacturers Cas.
Ins. Co., 229 La. 815, 86 So.2d 915 (1956) ; Salmon v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins.
Co., 229 La. 814, 86 So.2d 915 (1956) ; Graham v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co.,
229 La. 816, 86 So.2d 916 (1956).
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is Snodgrass v. Centanni.9 Defendant felled a large oak tree in
New Orleans so that it fell upon plaintiff's car which was mov-
ing upon a public street. The defendant's fault was not seriously
contested, but he contended that the plaintiff became aware of
the imminence of danger and saw one of defendant's workmen
waving his arms in an effort to stop him. Plaintiff also ob-
served cars ahead of him moving at a suddenly accelerated speed.
He attempted to increase his own speed so as to pass safely be-
fore the tree fell upon him, but he failed. The court observed
that a failure to adopt the most advisable procedure at a time
of emergency is not necessarily negligence. The emergency was
of the defendant's creation and he was not entitled to insist that
plaintiff, who was placed in sudden confusion by his conduct,
was negligent in failing to take those steps which hindsight
might suggest would have been more appropriate.
In line with the established jurisprudence the Supreme Court
has imposed liability on a power company for allowing its wires
to lose their insulation at a place where they enter a private
dwelling.10 A painter was electrocuted by coming into contact
with the wires. There were no eye witnesses. In answer to the
defendant's contention that the deceased was guilty of negligence
in painting in close proximity to the wires, the court replied
that there was no evidence showing the circumstances under
which the victim met his death, and it relied upon the well estab-
lished proposition that the defendant must affirmatively show
contributory negligence. The decision is eminently sound. Con-
cerns that traffic in dangerous substances are regarded almost
as insurers against injury or death, and the alleged carelessness
of the victim is usually sidestepped whenever possible. A con-
cern should not be allowed to expose the public to the risk of
electrocution and then insist that the victim did not do every-
thing possible to avoid the danger which was of the defendant's
making.
Joint Tortfeasors - Right to Indemnity
The Louisiana courts have consistently recognized that a
tortfeasor who is obliged to satisfy a judgment against him
may seek indemnity from a third party who, as between him-
self and the indemnity claimant, was primarily responsible for
9. 229 La. 915, 87 So.2d 127 (1956).
10. Stansbury v. Mayor & Councilmen of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d
445 (1955).
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the injury to the victim." A typical situation of this kind is
presented where a contractor who has been subjected to liability
to the owner because of damages inflicted through the negligence
of a sub-contractor is allowed indemnity against such sub-con-
tractor.12 This familiar principle, although seemingly applicable
to the facts of the recent case, Second Church of Christ, Scientist
v. Spencer,' was not referred to, and indemnity was denied.
The church entered into a contract with Spencer for certain
repairs and improvements in the upper part of the structure of
its building, including the installation of what is commonly called
a built-up roof. This latter item of work was sublet by Spencer
to defendant, Olympia Roofing Company. Due to careless in-
stallation of the last unit of temporary flashing by Olympia,
water entered the rear of the church building and seriously dam-
aged the organ. The only default of Spencer was his failure to
inspect the state of Olympia's work and to cover the area with
a tarpaulin if the condition was found to be unsafe. Plaintiff
was properly allowed a judgment against both Spencer and
Olympia, but Spencer's claim for indemnity over against Olympia
was dismissed. The court observed:
"The general contractor, Spencer, and the sub-contractor,
Olympia, being engaged in a concert of action, a common
unity of purpose and design, are joint tort-feasors, both
chargeable with the negligence in which this claim in dam-
ages finds it root."
Although both Spencer and Olympia were properly answer-
able to the church, yet Spencer's liability arose out of his arbi-
trary responsibility for the acts of his sub-contractor plus his
failure to take affirmative precautions against the negligence of
the sub-contractor. His personal fault, if any, was clearly sec-
ondary to that of Olympia, who created the dangerous condition
and who, as between himself and Spencer, was primarily charge-
able with the duty to provide protection. Our courts have not
yet decided expressly whether a claim for indemnity may be
interposed in the original suit against the indemnity claimant,
14
11. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922) ; American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 4 So.2d 628
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) ; Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917).
12. American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Gulf States Utilities Co., aupra.
13. 230 La. 432, 88 So.2d 810 (1956).
14. Such a claim was recognized, however, in Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La.
469, 75 So. 209 (1917).
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and perhaps the, instant decision could be regarded as a ruling
that this cannot be done. If so, Spencer's right to indemnity
can still be asserted once he has satisfied the judgment. But I
find it difficult to so interpret the decision.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The Employment Relation
The previously accepted position in this state that a working
partner is not entitled to workmen's compensation as against
the partnership was rejected last year by the Supreme Court in
Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.' After a full dis-
cussion of the Louisiana law of partnerships the court concluded
that a partnership is a legal entity in Louisiana, separate from
its members. In the Trappey case the claimant was a working
partner and received a wage in addition to his minor participa-
tion in the partnership profits. The position of the court is
commendable. There is no reason other than the possible tech-
nical theory of identity to justify the drawing of a distinction
between the wage earning partner and the worker employed by
a corporation, who holds stock in the enterprise that employs
him. The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court has been
achieved by statute in several common law jurisdictions.2 Al-
though the court did not mention the matter, it would appear
that the rule announced is applicable only to the wage earning
partner, who is entitled to his wage as a contract obligation of
the partnership independent of the profits which might accrue
to him by reason of his participation as a partner. In the Trap-
pey case it is noteworthy that suit was brought against the
partnership's liability insurer. In this way the claimant avoided
the procedural prohibition of suit between the individual partner
and the partnership.
In an interesting and well considered opinion by Justice Mc-
Caleb, the Supreme Court held that a church is a "trade, busi-
ness, or occupation" within the meaning of La. R.S. 23:1035,
and that its minister is an employee within the intendment of
1. 229 La. 632, 86 So.2d 515 (1956).
2. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 3359 (1943) ; MiCn. STAT. ANN. § 17.147 (Reis,
1947). Oklahoma is the only state apart from Louisiana that has recognized the
wage earning partner as an employee. Rodgers v. Blair, 201 Okla. 249, 204 1'.2d
867 (1949).
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the statute, so that he was entitled to compensation when he
was injured while using a motor vehicle for the performance
of his ministerial duties.3 In holding that a religious institution
is a business the court pointed out that the purpose of compen-
sation- to pass along to the ultimate consumers or users the
cost of the accident risks to which the enterprise is subjected -
embraces non-profit organizations as well as concerns that op-
erate for a profit. Those who derive the benefit of organized
religious worship should pay for its accident costs just as the
user of the services of a transportation organization must
shoulder the similar risks of accident to transportation em-
ployees. It is unfortunate that outworn notions of charitable
immunity to tort liability should have prompted a few courts
in other jurisdictions to reach the conclusion that charities are
not subject to compensation. 4 Our Supreme Court expressly re-
jected this argument in the case under discussion, and in so
doing aligned itself with the better considered decisions in other
jurisdictions. 5
I suggest that the court was on equally sound ground in de-
claring that a minister is an employee within the meaning of
the statute. Too often courts have followed the analogy of master
and servant law and have refused to find the necessary control
in the case of professional employees. Control is perhaps an
indispensable element of liability where the employer is being
subjected to vicarious liability to a third person for the acts
of his servant. In such cases the power of control is the only
excuse for imposing vicarious liability upon the blameless em-
ployer. In compensation, however, it is different. The purpose
of requiring a showing of an employment relationship in com-
pensation is primarily to establish that the worker is economi-
cally dependent on the enterprise which he serves and whose
business exposed him to the risk of injury. Skilled professional
employees are as much entitled to be protected against the risk
of accident as manual workers.
3. Meyers v. Southwest Region Conference Association of Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, 230 La. 310, 88 So.2d 381 (1956) ; Cox v. Southwest Region Conference
Association of Seventh Day Adventists, 230 La. 383, 88 So.2d 665 (1956).
4. Charitable employers are expressly excluded by the compensation statutes
of Arkansas, Georgia and Idaho. Several other states exclude activities that are
not carried on for pecuniary gain.
5. See, for example, Gardner v. Trustees of Main Street Methodist Episcopal
Church of Ottumwa, 250 N.W. 740 (Iowa 1933).
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The court faced no difficulty in finding that the business
was hazardous and that the minister was engaged in hazardous
work at the time of his accident. His duties required the fre-
quent use of an automobile, and he was injured while actively
using such a vehicle. A mere reference to the Haddad case6
would have sufficed to dispose of this point.7 It is therefore
interesting to conjecture as to why the court took this oppor-
tunity to make the gratuitous observation that Brownfield v.
Southern Amusement Company8 cannot be regarded as an au-
thoritative decision in this state. The Brownfield case was
wholly inapposite to the situation before the court. Mrs. Brown-
field, who used a car only occasionally in her duties as a theater
employee, was injured while she was in the ticket booth of her
employer, and the court declined to apply the doctrine of Byas
v. Hotel Bentley9 to the accident. But the Reverend Meyers,
who used a car frequently, was injured while actively engaged
in riding in a motor vehicle. An ultimate decision as to the
merits or demerits of the Brownfield opinion must eventually be
made.' 0 The problem is a difficult and extremely important one.
This reviewer regrets that a serious glancing blow was given the
Brownfield decision under circumstances in which it seems to
me this was unnecessary.
Nature of the Work Performed
The capacity of the judicial process for gradual growth
through erosion and reconstruction is beautifully illustrated in
the line of Louisiana cases dealing with the compensation rights
of a worker who is injured while doing repair, construction or
demolition work on the business structures of his employer.
Early in the history of our compensation litigation the courts
announced unequivocally that a business proprietor was not
liable for compensation to those employees who were hired to do
work of this character unless the employer was engaged in the
business of construction, repair, or demolition for other per-
6. Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Company, 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197
(1920).
7. MALONE, LOUISIANA rORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 99
(1951).
8. 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
9. 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1924) ; Malone, op. cit. supra § 101.
10. The Brownfield case has been followed by the court of appeal. Harrington
v. Franklin's Stores, 55 So.2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Brown v. Toler,
19 So.2d 680 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
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sons.11 Gradually, however, there emerged a line of decisions
in the courts of appeal to the effect that compensation should
be awarded the employee who does this character of work when
the business of the employer is, independently of that work, of
a hazardous character within the meaning of this statute.12 A
few years ago the Supreme Court placed its authority clearly
behind this new position. s
Even before this development there arose a tendency to allow
compensation to the repairmen of mortgage companies and other
large holders of property who are obliged to maintain a sizeable
crew of workers for the preservation of the security value of
property upon which they had loaned money.
14
These same general tendencies have become even more clearly
obvious in the recent case, Landry v. Fuselier.5 Fuselier op-
erated several businesses. He owned a piece of rental property,
a half-interest in a bar room, and a service station. Only this
latter business was clearly hazardous within the meaning of the
Compensation Statute. Fuselier likewise owned a vacant build-
ing, which had collapsed, and he employed the plaintiff, Landry,
his father-in-law, to assist in the demolition of this structure.
Landry was injured while so doing. The facts were susceptible
of the interpretation that Fuselier intended to use a part of the
salvaged material in improvements to his service station and
to use other parts in his saloon and in the erection of a home.
The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit denied compensation
on the ground that the intended use of the salvage material for
the service station was not satisfactorily established by the evi-
dence.'6 Judge Tate, dissented from this conclusion of fact.
More important, the dissent observed that it was not necessary
to show that the material was dedicated in the mind of the
employer to a use in connection with a business which is inde-
pendently hazardous. The demolition work itself was hazardous
11. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 102
(1951). See particularly Caldwell v. George Sproull Company, 184 La. 951, 168
So. 112 (1936). Of. Clementine v. Ritchie, 1 La. App. 296 (Or. 1924).
12. Rayburn v. De Moss, 194 La. 175, 193 So. 579 (1940) ; Hecker v. Betz,
172 So. 816 (La. App. Orl. 1937); Gonsoulin v. Southern Amusement Co., 32
So.2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947).
13. Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So.2d 824 (1952).
14. Compare McAllister v. Peoples Homestead & Savings Association, 171 So.
130 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) ; and Wood v. Peoples Homestead & Savings Associa-
tion, 177 So. 466 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
15. 230 La. 271, 88 So.2d 218 (1956).
16. Landry v. Fuselier, 230 La. 271, 87 So.2d 442 (1955).
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under the statute, and if work of this kind is a recurrent and
regular practice in connection with structures used for business
purposes, it falls within the protection of the act. This dissenting
opinion was adopted in full by the Supreme Court in reversing
the judgment and awarding compensation to Landry.
The Louisiana Compensation Statute provides for protection
against accidents that befall the person who is "performing ser-
vices arising out of and incidental to his employment in the
course of his employer's trade, business, or occupation."'1 7 The
Supreme Court has recently given new evidence of its liberal
attitude toward this requirement.' An employee, hired to work
in his employer's oil and gas business, was injured while as-
sisting in the removal of a fence surrounding his employer's
residence. Compensation was allowed despite the insurer's in-
sistence that the work being done had no relation to the em-
ployer's business, which it had insured. The same conclusion
has generally been reached in other jurisdictions that have faced
this problem.' 9 An opposite conclusion would place the employee
in a serious dilemma. Upon receiving orders to do personal work
for the employer he would be obliged to choose between sur-
rendering his compensation rights if he obeys and of running
the risk of being fired if he refuses. Courts have felt that this
is not cricket, and they have extended compensation protection
during the performance of the personal errand. But it cannot
be denied that this decision places an added burden on the in-
surer, who undertook to provide protection only against acci-
dents in the employer's business and who now finds himself
obliged to pay for injuries that are totally foreign to that busi-
ness. Superficially, it may be argued that once the rule has
been announced the insurer can readjust the premium rate to
protect against the added risk. But this only gets us into deeper
water. It is expected that premium charges will be added by the
employer as a cost of production and passed on to the con-
sumers of his product. One might question at this point whether
the purchaser of gas and oil should be required to pay more for
what he buys in order to support the accident cost incident to
repairing the oil driller's home fence.
17. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950).
18. Dobson v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 228 La. 837, 84 So. 210 (1955).
19. 1 LARSON, LAW OF WORICMEN'S COMPENSATION § 27.40 (1952).
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Disability
A welder's helper suffered an injury to his hand, necessitat-
ing an amputation of the upper portion of the middle finger and
resulting in numerous contusions and abrasions to all digits ex-
cept the thumb and index finger. He was disabled from perform-
ing his former work and also lost the ability to do heavy manual
labor. He further suffered continual pain when working be-
cause of frequent hitting and knocking the hand, which increased
his distress. The Supreme Court found that he was totally dis-
abled since he could not carry on his former occupation and was




Affirming the position adopted several years ago in Mottet
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,2 1 the Supreme Court has again
announced that the prescriptive period of one year does not com-
mence to run until total disability has developed.22 In Bigham v.
Swift & Company23 the claimant stumbled and fell while carry-
ing a heavy piece of meat for his employer on September 1, 1953.
On September 24 his ailment was diagnosed by the company
physician as a sacroiliac strain. A belt was provided and he was
treated for about three weeks, during which period he lost ten
or twelve days from work. He complained of illness again sev-
eral months later (presumably in March or April, 1954) and the
company physician pronounced him totally disabled in June 1954.
Suit was instituted September 23, 1954. The employer's plea of
prescription was dismissed. The period did not start running
until the worker was apprised of the disabling nature of his in-
jury in March or April of the year in which suit was instituted.2
4
20. Bean v. Higgins, Inc., 230 La. 211, 88 So.2d 30 (1956).
21. 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952).
22. See generally, MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND
PaAcnC § 384 (Supp. 1955).
23. 229 La. 341, 86 So.2d 59 (1956).
24. Accord, Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956)
(ruptured disc, first diagnosed as sprain; claimant continued working for seventy
weeks in severe pain).
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